

The Low-Minus-High Portfolio and the Factor Zoo

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- ▶ Hou, Xue, and Zhang (2017): 452 factors

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- ▶ We present a counterexample to this view

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
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
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- ▶ We want to understand why certain factors are particularly important
- ▶ We argue that the “demographics” of the zoo have key implications for asset-pricing tests

Investors' view vs. empiricist's view


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


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
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

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

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
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
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
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





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
- ▶ Consider the portfolio $\Delta = T_{agency} - M_{arket}$
 - ▶ Δ^+ assets are under-invested (cheap)
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- $\Rightarrow \Delta$ is a **Low-Minus-High** (LMH) portfolio



Proposition 2

The expected returns on all assets satisfy

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e] = \mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_T^e] \hat{\beta}_T \quad \Rightarrow \quad \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e] = \frac{\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_T^e] \hat{\sigma}_M^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_M^e] \hat{\sigma}_\Delta^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta}_\Delta$$



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FACTOR ZOO

An equilibrium interpretation of the LMH portfolio

- ▶ N firms with productivities driven by $J \leq N$ factors:

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\mathbf{Z}} &= \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{1,1} & \cdots & \phi_{1,J} \\ \vdots & \cdots & \vdots \\ \phi_{N,1} & \cdots & \phi_{N,J} \end{bmatrix} \left(\begin{pmatrix} F_1 \\ \vdots \\ F_J \end{pmatrix} + \begin{pmatrix} \tilde{F}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{F}_J \end{pmatrix} \right) + \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{\epsilon}_1 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{\epsilon}_N \end{bmatrix} \\ &\equiv \mathbf{\Phi}(\mathbf{F} + \tilde{\mathbf{F}}) + \tilde{\epsilon} \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

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- ▶ A continuum of investors with private information and CARA utility over terminal wealth \Rightarrow

$$\omega_i = \frac{1}{\gamma} \mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e | \mathcal{F}_i] \quad (2)$$

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- ▶ Total supply of shares is: $\mathbf{M} = \underbrace{\mathbf{M} - \tilde{\mathbf{m}}}_{\text{informed}} + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}$ (liquidity traders have inelastic demand $\tilde{\mathbf{m}}$, He and Wang, 1995)

- ▶ Market clearing:

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- ▶ Unconditional CAPM:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e] = \frac{\Sigma \mathbf{M}}{\mathbf{M}' \Sigma \mathbf{M}} (\mathbf{M}' \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e]) = \beta \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}_M^e] \quad (7)$$

Equilibrium and the unconditional CAPM

- ▶ Standard linear equilibrium (Proposition 1)

Corollary 1.1

In this economy, an unconditional CAPM relation holds:

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- ▶ Equivalently:

$$\frac{\mu_M}{\sigma_M} = \sqrt{\boldsymbol{\mu}'\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1}\boldsymbol{\mu}} \quad (9)$$

where $\boldsymbol{\mu} \equiv \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e]$, $\sigma_M^2 \equiv \mathbf{M}'\mathbf{\Sigma}\mathbf{M}$, and $\mu_M \equiv \mathbb{E}[\tilde{R}_M^e]$.

Predictability leaves a mark on empiricist's beta

- ▶ Investors view expected returns as a perturbation around the CAPM:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e | \mathcal{F}^i] = \beta \mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e] + \boldsymbol{\epsilon}^i, \quad \boldsymbol{\epsilon}^i \sim \mathcal{N}(\mathbf{0}, \text{Var}[\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e | \mathcal{F}_i]]) \quad (10)$$

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- ▶ This mark has two origins:

$$\text{Var}[\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e | \mathcal{F}_i]] = \underbrace{\text{Var}[\bar{\mathbb{E}}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e]]}_{\text{time-series variation}} + \underbrace{\text{Var}[\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e | \mathcal{F}_i] - \bar{\mathbb{E}}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e]]}_{\text{cross-sectional variation}} \quad (12)$$

Average agent vs. empiricist

Corollary 1.3

Under the information set of the empiricist, the unconditional market portfolio is not mean-variance efficient:

$$\frac{\mu_M}{\hat{\sigma}_M} < \sqrt{\boldsymbol{\mu}' \hat{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\mu}} \quad (13)$$

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

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

- ▶ Follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. The only (pathological) case with equality is:

$$\{\text{only one factor } F\} \wedge \{\mathbf{M} \propto \boldsymbol{\Phi}\} \quad (14)$$

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Proposition 2

Define $\Delta \equiv T - M$ and write the expected returns on all assets as

$$\mu = \frac{\mu_T \widehat{\sigma}_M^2}{\widehat{\sigma}_T^2} \widehat{\beta} + \frac{\mu_T \widehat{\sigma}_\Delta^2}{\widehat{\sigma}_T^2} \widehat{\beta}_\Delta$$

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$$= c_1 \hat{\Sigma} - c_2 \Phi \Phi', \text{ with } c_1, c_2 > 0 \quad (16)$$

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$$\mu = \lambda_1 \hat{\beta} - \lambda_2 \frac{\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{P}]}{K}, \text{ with } \lambda_1, \lambda_2 > 0 \quad (18)$$

CAPM holds, all investors agree on it but empiricist rejects it

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Investment factor:

$$\mathbb{E}[\tilde{\mathbf{R}}^e] = -\eta_0 \mathbf{1} + \eta_1 \hat{\beta} - \eta_2 \mathbb{E}[\mathbf{I}^*]/K, \text{ with } \eta_0, \eta_1, \eta_2 > 0 \quad (20)$$

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⇒ characteristics are proxies for **unobservable** risk factors

Unleashing the factor zoo

- ▶ Consider now the case with $J > 1$ factors. Then:

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Proposition 6

Denoting by $\hat{B}_k = \Phi_k' \hat{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{1}$, beta on LMH satisfies:

$$\hat{\beta}_{\Delta} = \sum_{k=1}^J c_k \hat{\Sigma} (\mathbf{M} - \underbrace{\hat{\Sigma}^{-1} \Phi_k / \hat{B}_k}_{\substack{\text{efficient portfolio} \\ \text{fully invested in factor } k}}) \quad (23)$$

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- ▶ A large economy: $N, J \rightarrow \infty$, $J/N \rightarrow \psi$ (and $T/N^{3/2} \rightarrow \varphi$)

The factor zoo in a large economy (cont'd)

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

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

- ▶ E.g., assume that loadings Φ have IID entries with mean 0, variance 1 and finite fourth moment

⇒ the eigenvalues of $\Phi' \Phi / N$ follow the Marchenko-Pastur law, which defines zoo demographics in this example

The factor zoo in a large economy (cont'd)




The factor zoo in a large economy (cont'd)




The factor zoo in a large economy (cont'd)



GRS test (1% level)



Zoo demographics




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


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


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


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

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



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

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The factor zoo in a large economy (cont'd)



- ▶ Demographics of the zoo matter for the outcome of the test
- ▶ in this example, a few highly predictable factors or many irrelevant factors is bad for the empiricist

Illustration in the *Size-B/M* portfolio space



- ▶ Monthly data, July 1963-December 2018, 666 months

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LMH		-0.40	0.45	-0.06	0.06	0.38	0.11
MKT	-0.40		-0.24	0.26	-0.19	-0.32	-0.09
HML	0.46	-0.24		-0.14	-0.20	0.68	-0.16
SMB	-0.02	0.27	-0.19		-0.27	-0.16	0.01
RMW	0.08	-0.21	0.06	-0.39		-0.20	0.17
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- ▶ Strong negative correlation with MKT
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Regressions: LMH on six factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Intercept	0.0185 (6.48)	0.0109 (3.89)	0.0150 (4.74)	0.0142 (4.80)	0.0103 (3.98)	0.0128 (4.47)	0.0094 (3.75)
MKT	-0.6937 (-7.04)						-0.4812 (-4.97)
HML		1.2319 (6.28)					1.0812 (6.40)
SMB			-0.0502 (-0.28)				0.3952 (2.82)
RMW				0.2714 (0.80)			0.1374 (0.55)
CMA					1.6169 (8.61)		0.3026 (1.29)
MOM						0.3130 (2.40)	0.3759 (3.86)
Adj. R^2	0.1575	0.2070	-0.0011	0.0046	0.1814	0.0284	0.3569
Obs.	666	666	666	666	666	666	666

Regressions: LMH on six factors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Intercept	0.0185 (6.48)	0.0109 (3.89)	0.0150 (4.74)	0.0142 (4.80)	0.0103 (3.98)	0.0128 (4.47)	0.0094 (3.75)
MKT	-0.6937 (-7.04)						-0.4812 (-4.97)
HML		1.2319 (6.28)					1.0812 (6.40)
SMB			-0.0502 (-0.28)				0.3952 (2.82)
RMW				0.2714 (0.80)			0.1374 (0.55)
CMA					1.6169 (8.61)		0.3026 (1.29)
MOM						0.3130 (2.40)	0.3759 (3.86)
Adj. R^2	0.1575	0.2070	-0.0011	0.0046	0.1814	0.0284	0.3569
Obs.	666	666	666	666	666	666	666

Regressions: six factors on LMH


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MKT	HML	SMB	RMW	CMA	MOM
Intercept	0.0086 (5.87)	0.0007 (0.72)	0.0022 (1.78)	0.0022 (2.61)	0.0011 (1.53)	0.0052 (2.71)
LMH	-0.2288 (-7.49)	0.1690 (7.21)	-0.0082 (-0.28)	0.0224 (0.83)	0.1129 (6.88)	0.0954 (2.17)
Adj. R^2	0.1575	0.2070	-0.0011	0.0046	0.1814	0.0284
Obs.	666	666	666	666	666	666

Regressions: six factors on LMH


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	MKT	HML	SMB	RMW	CMA	MOM
Intercept	0.0086 (5.87)	0.0007 (0.72)	0.0022 (1.78)	0.0022 (2.61)	0.0011 (1.53)	0.0052 (2.71)
LMH	-0.2288 (-7.49)	0.1690 (7.21)	-0.0082 (-0.28)	0.0224 (0.83)	0.1129 (6.88)	0.0954 (2.17)
Adj. R^2	0.1575	0.2070	-0.0011	0.0046	0.1814	0.0284
Obs.	666	666	666	666	666	666

$$\mathbb{E}[R^e] = \hat{\alpha} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_T^e] \hat{\sigma}_M^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_M^e] \hat{\sigma}_\Delta^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta}_\Delta \quad (29)$$

(a) CAPM




(b) Two-factor model




$$0.0005 \quad 0.0049 \quad 0.0241 \quad R^2 = 0.89$$

$$\mathbb{E}[R^e] = \hat{\alpha} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_T^e] \hat{\sigma}_M^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_M^e] \hat{\sigma}_\Delta^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta}_\Delta \quad (29)$$

(a) CAPM




(b) Two-factor model




$$0.0005 \quad 0.0049 \quad 0.0241 \quad R^2 = 0.89$$

$$\mathbb{E}[R^e] = \hat{\alpha} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_T^e] \hat{\sigma}_M^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta} + \frac{\mathbb{E}[R_M^e] \hat{\sigma}_\Delta^2}{\hat{\sigma}_T^2} \hat{\beta}_\Delta \quad (29)$$

(a) CAPM



(b) Two-factor model



$$R_n(t) = \alpha_n + \tilde{\beta}_n R_{MKT}(t) + \tilde{\beta}_{\Delta,n} R_{LMH}(t) + \epsilon_n(t), \quad n = 1, \dots, 25$$

	Low	2	3	4	High	Low	2	3	4	High
	$\alpha_n(\%)$					$t\text{-stat}(\alpha_n)$				
Small	-0.26	0.06	0.07	0.19	0.21	-1.30	0.32	0.47	1.35	1.42
2	-0.04	0.08	0.13	0.10	0.07	-0.29	0.62	1.21	1.00	0.56
3	-0.07	0.08	0.08	0.12	0.20	-0.57	0.87	0.92	1.31	1.63
4	0.05	0.04	0.01	0.15	0.08	0.56	0.51	0.14	1.71	0.68
Big	0.07	0.06	-0.03	-0.06	0.07	1.08	1.02	-0.45	-0.61	0.53
	$\tilde{\beta}_n$					$t\text{-stat}(\tilde{\beta}_n)$				
Small	1.32	1.25	1.15	1.11	1.18	27.75	29.33	33.63	33.42	33.38
2	1.32	1.20	1.13	1.11	1.24	36.56	40.73	42.26	43.94	38.87
3	1.27	1.17	1.06	1.06	1.16	42.10	52.54	49.44	47.69	39.45
4	1.19	1.09	1.08	1.03	1.16	51.74	60.39	54.36	49.41	40.69
Big	0.96	0.94	0.91	0.93	1.00	64.48	66.71	48.86	39.86	32.13
	$\tilde{\beta}_{\Delta,n}$					$t\text{-stat}(\tilde{\beta}_{\Delta,n})$				
Small	-0.12	0.04	0.06	0.14	0.16	-4.53	1.47	3.25	7.27	7.95
2	-0.11	0.03	0.09	0.13	0.16	-5.21	1.79	5.78	9.21	8.57
3	-0.07	0.06	0.06	0.12	0.12	-4.13	4.41	5.05	9.40	7.10
4	-0.05	-0.01	0.07	0.09	0.08	-3.51	-0.52	6.19	7.51	4.89
Big	-0.05	-0.02	0.06	0.04	0.03	-5.94	-2.22	5.84	2.67	1.58

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
β_{MOM}							0.0254 (3.47)	0.0015 (0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.0479	0.8852	0.6272	0.8898	0.7270	0.8900	0.8126	0.8835
GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
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β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
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Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
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GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
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β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
β_{MOM}							0.0254 (3.47)	0.0015 (0.18)
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GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
β_{MOM}							0.0254 (3.47)	0.0015 (0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.0479	0.8852	0.6272	0.8898	0.7270	0.8900	0.8126	0.8835
GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Wald test (Intercept=0, β_{MKT} =0.0052, β_{LMH} =0.0149) \Rightarrow p-value=35%

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
β_{MOM}							0.0254 (3.47)	0.0015 (0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.0479	0.8852	0.6272	0.8898	0.7270	0.8900	0.8126	0.8835
GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
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β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
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GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
β_{MOM}							0.0254 (3.47)	0.0015 (0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.0479	0.8852	0.6272	0.8898	0.7270	0.8900	0.8126	0.8835
GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
β_{LMH}		0.0241 (4.57)		0.0284 (5.56)		0.0263 (6.25)		0.0264 (5.96)
β_{HML}			0.0034 (3.09)	0.0033 (2.91)	0.0030 (2.70)	0.0032 (2.88)	0.0033 (2.98)	0.0032 (2.87)
β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
β_{RMW}					0.0049 (2.88)	0.0012 (0.71)	0.0057 (2.83)	0.0011 (0.60)
β_{CMA}					-0.0007 (-0.38)	-0.0003 (-0.19)	-0.0013 (-0.63)	-0.0003 (-0.18)
β_{MOM}							0.0254 (3.47)	0.0015 (0.18)
Adj. R^2	0.0479	0.8852	0.6272	0.8898	0.7270	0.8900	0.8126	0.8835
GLS R^2	0.1087	0.6457	0.2838	0.6595	0.3352	0.6781	0.4636	0.6801
Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Cross-sectional regressions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Intercept	0.0117 (3.01)	0.0005 (0.10)	0.0122 (4.63)	-0.0007 (-0.18)	0.0098 (3.31)	0.0007 (0.17)	0.0028 (0.66)	0.0007 (0.18)
β_{MKT}	-0.0042 (-1.00)	0.0049 (0.92)	-0.0067 (-2.16)	0.0064 (1.43)	-0.0047 (-1.37)	0.0049 (1.13)	0.0025 (0.55)	0.0048 (1.13)
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β_{SMB}			0.0015 (1.23)	0.0021 (1.72)	0.0020 (1.63)	0.0021 (1.75)	0.0021 (1.71)	0.0021 (1.75)
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Obs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25

Panel A: Sorts involving prior returns

	Momentum			ST Reversal			LT Reversal		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Intercept	0.0170 (4.75)	-0.0035 (-0.42)	0.0251 (3.17)	0.0022 (0.68)	-0.0048 (-0.81)	-0.0003 (-0.03)	0.0052 (1.68)	0.0035 (0.97)	0.0195 (1.47)
MKT	-0.0101 (-2.55)	0.0114 (1.32)	-0.0169 (-1.96)	0.0030 (0.82)	0.0099 (1.63)	0.0049 (0.57)	0.0010 (0.29)	0.0023 (0.60)	-0.0136 (-1.04)
LMH		0.1058 (2.22)			0.0442 (2.15)			0.0124 (1.62)	
HML			-0.0093 (-1.44)			0.0200 (2.20)			-0.0016 (-0.40)
SMB			0.0036 (0.61)			-0.0011 (-0.23)			0.0064 (1.29)
Adj. R^2	0.1817	0.9502	0.8351	-0.0251	0.1233	0.7987	-0.1076	0.7976	0.9063
Obs.	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

Panel B: Sorts involving Investment, E/P, and CF/P

	Investment			Earnings/Price			Cashflow/Price		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Intercept	0.0096 (3.59)	-0.0042 (-0.73)	0.0104 (1.54)	0.0102 (2.27)	-0.0006 (-0.14)	0.0088 (0.99)	0.0114 (2.47)	-0.0009 (-0.17)	0.0115 (1.54)
MKT	-0.0037 (-1.19)	0.0096 (1.61)	-0.0048 (-0.70)	-0.0042 (-0.88)	0.0064 (1.29)	-0.0031 (-0.35)	-0.0055 (-1.14)	0.0067 (1.17)	-0.0058 (-0.76)
LMH		0.0441 (2.59)			0.0239 (2.66)			0.0252 (2.19)	
HML			0.0028 (1.31)			0.0023 (1.44)			0.0012 (0.72)
SMB			0.0038 (1.27)			0.0071 (1.56)			0.0087 (2.06)
Adj. R^2	0.0784	0.6816	0.4318	-0.0532	0.9071	0.8698	0.0585	0.6843	0.8627
Obs.	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10


Panel A: Sorts involving prior returns

	Momentum			ST Reversal			LT Reversal		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Intercept	0.0170 (4.75)	-0.0035 (-0.42)	0.0251 (3.17)	0.0022 (0.68)	-0.0048 (-0.81)	-0.0003 (-0.03)	0.0052 (1.68)	0.0035 (0.97)	0.0195 (1.47)
MKT	-0.0101 (-2.55)	0.0114 (1.32)	-0.0169 (-1.96)	0.0030 (0.82)	0.0099 (1.63)	0.0049 (0.57)	0.0010 (0.29)	0.0023 (0.60)	-0.0136 (-1.04)
LMH		0.1058 (2.22)			0.0442 (2.15)			0.0124 (1.62)	
HML			-0.0093 (-1.44)			0.0200 (2.20)			-0.0016 (-0.40)
SMB			0.0036 (0.61)			-0.0011 (-0.23)			0.0064 (1.29)
Adj. R^2	0.1817	0.9502	0.8351	-0.0251	0.1233	0.7987	-0.1076	0.7976	0.9063
Obs.	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10


Panel B: Sorts involving Investment, E/P, and CF/P

	Investment			Earnings/Price			Cashflow/Price		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Intercept	0.0096 (3.59)	-0.0042 (-0.73)	0.0104 (1.54)	0.0102 (2.27)	-0.0006 (-0.14)	0.0088 (0.99)	0.0114 (2.47)	-0.0009 (-0.17)	0.0115 (1.54)
MKT	-0.0037 (-1.19)	0.0096 (1.61)	-0.0048 (-0.70)	-0.0042 (-0.88)	0.0064 (1.29)	-0.0031 (-0.35)	-0.0055 (-1.14)	0.0067 (1.17)	-0.0058 (-0.76)
LMH		0.0441 (2.59)			0.0239 (2.66)			0.0252 (2.19)	
HML			0.0028 (1.31)			0.0023 (1.44)			0.0012 (0.72)
SMB			0.0038 (1.27)			0.0071 (1.56)			0.0087 (2.06)
Adj. R^2	0.0784	0.6816	0.4318	-0.0532	0.9071	0.8698	0.0585	0.6843	0.8627
Obs.	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10


(a) 25 *Size-B/M* portfolios




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


[3] = MKT+HML+SMB+RMW+CMA+MOM

[2] = MKT+HML+SMB+RMW+CMA


[1] = MKT+HML+SMB

(a) 25 *Size-B/M* portfolios




► Hundreds of anomalies \Rightarrow evidence against the CAPM

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- ▶ Anomalies are driven by movements in expected returns

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Empiricist's view (econometric intuition)

- ▶ Assume rational expectations:

$$R_{t+1}^e = \mathbb{E}_t[R_{t+1}^e] + \varepsilon_{t+1}; \quad \mathbb{E}_t[\varepsilon_{t+1}] = 0, \quad \mathbb{E}_t[\varepsilon_{t+1}\varepsilon'_{t+1}] = \Sigma \quad (30)$$

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- ▶ Two ways to write the unconditional CAPM:

$$\mathbb{E}[R_{t+1}^e] = \underbrace{\frac{\Sigma M}{M' \Sigma M}}_{\beta} \mathbb{E}[R_{M,t+1}^e] \quad (31)$$

$$\underbrace{R_{t+1}^e - \mathbb{E}_t[R_{t+1}^e]}_{\varepsilon_{t+1}} = \beta \underbrace{(R_{M,t+1}^e - \mathbb{E}_t[R_{M,t+1}^e])}_{M' \varepsilon_{t+1}} + z_{t+1} \quad (32)$$

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and thus

$$\hat{\beta} = \beta + \frac{\text{Var}[\mathbb{E}_t[R_{M,t+1}^e]]}{\text{Var}[R_{M,t+1}^e]} \underbrace{\left(\frac{\text{Cov}[\mathbb{E}_t[R_{M,t+1}^e], R_{M,t+1}^e]}{\text{Var}[R_{M,t+1}^e]} - \beta \right)}_{\neq 0} \quad (34)$$

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$$\hat{R}_{t+1}^e = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta} R_{M,t+1}^e + \hat{z}_{t+1} \quad (33)$$

and thus

$$\hat{\beta} = \beta + \frac{\text{Var}[\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_t[R_{M,t+1}^e]}_{\text{EIV rhs}}]}{\text{Var}[R_{M,t+1}^e]} \underbrace{\left(\frac{\text{Cov}[\underbrace{\mathbb{E}_t[R_{M,t+1}^e]}_{\text{EIV lhs}}, R_{M,t+1}^e]}{\text{Var}[R_{M,t+1}^e]} - \beta \right)}_{\neq 0} \quad (34)$$